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Regulating Cyberactivity Disclosures:
A Contractarian Approach
Keith Sharfmant
Users of an online service or operating system' providing
access to the Internet often can monitor each other:2 fellow users
can discover each other's identities and can, at least to some
extent, observe each other's 'cyberactivity.'3 This 'disclosure
environment' is beneficial insofar as the prospect of outside
observation deters those who would otherwise engage in socially
undesirable conduct4 from so engaging.5 The capacity for mon-
itoring, however, is harmful in that it chills some socially useful
activities as well.' Another ill effect of monitoring is that it ex-
t B.A. 1993, Johns Hopkins University; J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Chicago.
The best example of this is "UNIX," the computer operating system most commonly
used at universities to provide access to the Internet. The claim I make concerning
monitoring is true for UNIX and is often true for other operating systems as well.
2 For a description of this monitoring potential in the UNIX context, see Lawrence
Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 Yale L J 1743, 1748 (1995). In addition to being moni-
tored by their peers, users can, of course, be monitored by system operators. Necessary
monitoring by a single system operator whose identity is known (or can readily be discov-
ered) by the user is, however, less surprising to the user and therefore less troubling than
potential monitoring by a myriad of fellow users. For this reason, monitoring by system
operators is not a concern of this Comment.
' 'Cyberactivity' is my own term and is meant to connote the various reading, brows-
ing, and communications activities in which a system user might engage.
Harassment, slander, blackmail, and (verbal) assault are examples of undesirable
activities that are facilitated when the perpetrator is cloaked in anonymity. Several com-
mentators have pointed to these and other potential abuses that would be facilitated by
an anonymity environment. See George P. Long, III, Who Are You?: Identity and Anonym-
ity in Cyberspace, 55 U Pitt L Rev 1177, 1184 (1994). Lamentably, such abuses have
actually occurred. See United States v Baker, 890 F Supp 1375 (ED Mich 1995) (dis-
missing charges against college student who allegedly made anonymous, electronically
transmitted threats to injure, kidnap, and rape a female classmate).
' Other possible benefits of a disclosure environment include: (1) the potential for
businesses to identify likely consumers of their products at a low cost; (2) the potential for
individuals to identify others with similar backgrounds, situations, predicaments, habits,
or interests; and (3) the potential for individuals and businesses to learn from (either by
copying or by avoiding the mistakes of) the "netsurfing" techniques of others.
6 Such activities include the free exchange of controversial or unpopular ideas and
freedom to associate with groups that espouse politically unpopular views. America's
founders so highly valued these freedoms that their exercise is protected by the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court has zealously enforced this
protection, reviewing all government efforts to curtail these freedoms under a "strict
scrutiny" standard. See NAACP v Alabama, 357 US 449, 461 (1958); Gibson v Florida
640 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1996:
poses users who are unaware of a system's monitoring capabili-
ties to potential invasions of their privacy.7
Against this backdrop of competing policy considerations, a
debate now rages among academics and policymakers over how
best to regulate cyberactivity disclosures. There are those who
favor a governmentally imposed regime of mandatory disclosure,8
arguing that the social gains from disclosure outweigh its atten-
dant costs. Others, however, take the opposite view, arguing that
anonymity ought to be guaranteed to protect the user's privacy
notwithstanding the attendant social cost of this protection.9 A
third view ° is that government-both legislatures and the
courts-should neither guarantee nor ban anonymity but should
instead adopt a 'wait and see' approach to give both society and
governmental institutions sufficient time to arrive at a common
Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 US 539, 545 (1963).
7 The cost here is the shame system users might feel upon finding out that their
ostensibly private activities in fact were-or could have been-observed by others. The
privacy concern raised by cyberspace is similar to the fear that telephone companies could
disclose information about their customers' calling habits to third parties or the fear that
video store proprietors could share information about their customers' viewing habits with
third parties. In the telephone and video contexts, however, courts and legislatures have
somewhat alleviated these privacy concerns. For an example of courts protecting customer
privacy in the telephone context, see Barasch v Bell Telephone Co., 529 Pa 523, 605 A2d
1198 (1992) (holding telephone company's "Caller ID" service violated state Wiretap Act
because it nonconsensually deprived callers of their anonymity). For an example of protec-
tive legislation in the telephone context, see Cal Pub Util Code § 2891 (West 1994) (pro-
hibiting telephone companies from disclosing what services their customers purchase). For
legislation in the video context, see The Video and Library Protection Act of 1988, 18 USC
§ 2710(b) (1994) (prohibiting video providers from knowingly disclosing personal informa-
tion about their customers, such as titles of movies rented, without first obtaining written
consent). As yet, there are no similar analogous mandated privacy protections in
cyberspace.
, Consider the proposal of Connecticut State Representative Pat Dillon "that would
virtually eliminate anonymity on-line." Lessig, 104 Yale L J at 1750 n 20 (cited in note 2)
(citing Beverly Galge, The Babe File, New Haven Advocate 7 (Feb 9, 1995)). See also
Walter S. Mossberg, Accountability Is Key to Democracy in the On-Line World, Wall St J
B1 (Jan 26, 1995) (arguing that "[olur democracy and society require accountability, not
anonymity.... ."). Some universities, including Harvard, have already forbidden anony-
mous postings. See Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability:
Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 Yale L J 1639, 1643 n 11 (1995).
' Consider the vigorous defense of privacy and anonymity protections in response to
the government's recent "Clipper Chip" proposal. Lessig, 104 Yale L J at 1751 n 23 (cited
in note 2) (citing National Research Council, Rights and Responsibilities of Participants in
Networked Communities 25 (Dorothy E. Denning & Herbert S. Lin, eds, National Acade-
my Press, 1994)). Similar defenses of online anonymity abound on the Internet itself. For
instance, see Raph Levien, Chaos and Anonymity Keep the Internet Vital, draft of editorial
to be sent to San Francisco Chronicle posted on the Internet (Jan 14, 1995) (on file with
the author).
1" This view is espoused, principally, by Professor Lessig. See Lessig, 104 Yale L J at
1752-53 (cited in note 2). See also Branscomb, 104 Yale L J at 1678-79 (cited in note 8).
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understanding of this new frontier called cyberspace." A fourth
view is that cyberactivity disclosure ought to be governed by
contract. 2
Proponents of the 'contract' approach to the regulation of
cyberactivity disclosure have not suggested, however, what
default rule 3 courts should adopt in the absence of an express
contract. 14  Possible approaches include adopting either a
" Lessig, 104 Yale L J at 1754 n 32 (cited in note 2).
12 The Clinton Administration has argued in favor of a contractarian approach in a
recent Commerce Department White Paper. See Ronald H. Brown, et al, Privacy and the
NIl: Safeguarding Telecommunications-Related Personal Information, US Department of
Commerce (1995) (arguing that system operators should be required to "provide notice"
and to obtain "customer consent" before collecting and using "sensitive personal informa-
tion" concerning their users, and to "provide notice" and to receive "tacit consent" before
collecting and using any other nonsensitive, personal information). The 'contract' approach
to cyberspace was first suggested in David R. Johnson and Kevin A. Marks, Mapping
Electronic Data Communications onto Existing Legal Metaphors: Should We Let Our
Conscience (and Our Contracts) Be Our Guide?, 38 Vill L Rev 487 (1993).
13 Default rules determine the legal status of parties in the absence of express con-
tractual provisions to the contrary. That is, they "fill the gaps" left open by incompletely
specified agreements. On default rules generally, see Charles J. Goetz and Robert E.
Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express
and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Cal L Rev 261 (1985); Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J
87 (1989); Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promis-
ing, 88 Mich L Rev 489 (1989); Jules L. Coleman, Douglas D. Heckathorn, and Steven M.
Maser, A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in
Contract Law, 12 Harv J L & Pub Pol 639 (1989); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Si-
lence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 Va L Rev 821 (1992); Ian Ayres and
Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules,
101 Yale L J 729 (1992); Symposium on Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 3 S Cal
Interdisciplinary L J 1 (1993). In the context of cyberactivity monitoring, statutes or com-
mon law doctrine could set the default rule in favor of either anonymity or disclosure. By
definition, a default rule is "waivable" rather than "immutable." The party against whom
the default rule is set can, with the other party's express agreement, have the rule waived
in favor of an alternative rule. Ayres & Gertner, 99 Yale L J at 87.
14 True, the Clinton Administration has argued that the customer's "consent" ought to
be obtained, which is in effect an anonymity default rule. Notably absent from the
government's White Paper, however, is a statement of how the proposed contract regime
would be enforced. See Brown, Privacy and the NIl: Safeguarding Telecommunications-
Related Personal Information (cited in note 12). The paper leaves open the questions of
injunctive relief and damage remedies for consumers whose privacy rights have been
violated as well as the institutional issue of who should promulgate and enforce the
rule-the legislature, the common law courts, or an administrative agency?
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'market-mimicking'15 or a 'penalty'16 default rule around which
the parties-system users and operators-can expressly contract.
Building on the default rule approach found in the academic
literature on contracts, this Comment argues for the adoption of
a default rule-either by statute or at common law-permitting
system operators to disclose (or to facilitate disclosure of) their
users' 'cyberactivities' to third parties, so long as users are
warned ex ante that they will be operating in a disclosure envi-
ronment and are offered an opportunity to 'opt out' if they choose.
The Comment argues against both anonymity default and immu-
table, mandatory disclosure rules, as well as against Professor
Lessig's 'wait and see' suggestion. The Comment rejects an ano-
nymity default rule, because anonymity is probably not the pre-
ferred choice of most system users. 7 Likewise, the Comment
rejects the mandatory disclosure approach because such a rule
would deny privacy protection across the board-even to those
who place an especially high value on privacy. s The Comment
" The phrase, coined by Charles Goetz and Robert Scott, suggests that "[i]deally, the
preformulated rules supplied by the state should mimic the agreements contracting par-
ties would reach were they costlessly to bargain out each detail of the transaction."
Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory
of Contractual Obligation, 69 Va L Rev 967, 971 (1983). The best expression of this 'market-
mimicking' idea in an actual case is Market Street Associates Ltd. v Frey, 941 F2d 588,
596 (7th Cir. 1991) (declaring the "overriding purpose of contract law" to be "to give the
parties what they would have stipulated for expressly if at the time of making the con-
tract they had had complete knowledge of the future and the costs of negotiating and
adding provisions to the contract had been zero."). Market-mimicking default rules are
sometimes referred to as 'majoritarian' because they mimic only what most people would
have wanted to do in a given situation, not what everyone would have done. See Ayres &
Gertner, 99 Yale L J at 90-91 (cited in note 13); Craswell, 88 Mich L Rev at 504 (cited in
note 13). For a more recent treatment of majoritarian, market-mimicking default rules,
see Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L J 1027 (1995).
"6 Rather than being determined on the basis of what most similarly situated parties
"would have wanted" had they known all the facts in advance and been able to bargain
costlessly, a penalty default rule is deliberately slanted against a particular party, usually
the more sophisticated party and thus the party more likely to know the rule and best
equipped to contract around the rule ex ante. Often referred to as "information forcing," a
penalty default rule induces the party more likely to know the background legal rule to
share that information with its counterpart (in the course of contracting around the rule)
by penalizing parties that force courts to adjudicate issues arising ex post that the parties
themselves could have resolved more cheaply in advance. On penalty default rules gener-
ally, see Ayres & Gertner, 99 Yale L J at 93-94 (cited in note 13).
"7 This is an empirical claim based on the observation that the current legal regime
does not protect anonymity and yet most users do not seem to mind. See note 30 for a
discussion and defense of this claim.
18 Moreover, the rule would be impracticable given the now widespread use of "anon-
ymous remailers," which allow message senders to conceal-impenetrably-their identi-
ties. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip,
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similarly rejects 'wait and see' because this approach does not tell
a court what to do when an actual dispute arises, and waiting
and seeing is no longer an option.19 This Comment argues in-
stead in favor of disclosure as the default environment. This
waivable disclosure rule should be slanted in the direction that
most of the people the rule affects would prefer-disclosure--and
yet should be flexible enough to meet the idiosyncratic privacy
concerns of the small number of sensitive users that every sys-
tem inevitably has.
Part I of this Comment explores the anonymity default rule,
the mandatory disclosure rule, and the 'wait and see' approaches,
rejecting all three. Part II of this Comment develops, and argues
in favor of, the waivable disclosure rule approach.
I. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM
A. An Anonymity Default Rule
Some scholars and politicians2 ° argue that because the poli-
cy concerns in favor of protecting the right to anonymity are so
strong, anonymity should be adopted as a default rule.2 In an
anonymity default environment, a system operator wishing to
create a disclosure environment would have to receive affirmative
contractual consent from the user to avoid the liability rule2 a
court would otherwise impose.
and the Constitution, 143 U Pa L Rev 709 (1995).
" Were a court to deny a system user any remedy against a system operator that
had made nonconsensual disclosures of the user's activities, the court would, in effect, be
choosing a default rule in favor of disclosure. 'Waiting and seeing' is thus itself a choice.
20 See Ronald H. Brown, et al, Privacy and the NIl: Safeguarding Telecommunica-
tions-Related Personal Information, US Department of Commerce (1995) (cited in note 12)
(arguing for a requirement that "consent" be obtained from system users before informa-
tion concerning them can be collected and used); David R. Johnson and Kevin A. Marks,
Mapping Electronic Data Communications onto Existing Legal Metaphors: Should We Let
Our Conscience (and Our Contracts) Be Our Guide?, 38 Vill L Rev 487 (1993) (cited in
note 12); Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 Yale L J 1743, 1751 n 23 (1995)
(cited in note 2) (citing National Research Council, Rights and Responsibilities of Par-
ticipants in Networked Communities 25 (Dorothy E. Denning & Herbert S. Lin, eds, Na-
tional Academy Press, 1994)).
21 It should be noted that these commentators argue for adoption only as a default
rule and nothing more. Neither a legislature nor a court could make this rule inalienable
because doing so would obviously violate the First Amendment. System users cannot be
stopped from revealing their own identities should they choose to do so.
22 A it is determined by legislative enactment or common law doctrine. Setting a
damage amount would be difficult, but not more difficult than any other instance where a
plaintiff needs compensation for a nonpecuniary loss.
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There are indeed some strong policy arguments in favor of
protecting anonymity in cyberspace, though anonymity is by no
means constitutionally guaranteed.23 Included among these poli-
cy arguments are the notions that anonymity: (1) promotes the
free exchange of ideas;24 (2) ensures the protection of a group's
ability to associate freely;2  and (3) protects the user from an-
noying business solicitations and embarrassing personal revela-
tions.
There are, however, other policy arguments which point in
the opposite direction. Benefits of a disclosure environment in-
clude: (1) the ability of businesses to identify likely customers at
a low cost; (2) the ability of individuals to identify others with
similar backgrounds or interests; (3) the potential for individuals
and businesses to learn 'netsurfing' techniques from each other;
and (4) the deterring effect of disclosure on the commission of
crimes and torts in cyberspace.
Moreover, many of the policy justifications for protecting
anonymity could just as easily be addressed in other legal re-
gimes. Consider, for instance, a flexible disclosure environment
that allows users affirmatively to "opt" for anonymity.26 Consid-
er too that users who value their privacy especially highly can al-
ways protect themselves unilaterally, regardless of the underly-
ing legal rule, by resorting to "anonymous remailer" technolo-
23 This claim needs to be qualified somewhat. The Supreme Court has recognized "the
right of an individual not to have his private affairs made public by the government."
Whalen v Roe, 429 US 589, 599 n 24 (1977) (upholding a New York statute requiring state
officials to keep computerized records of New York citizens who use certain drugs).
Disclosure is permitted, however, when the public interest in disclosure outweighs the
individual privacy interest at stake. Id at 598-604. Therefore it is constitutionally permis-
sible for the government to compel disclosure when there is a sufficiently strong public
interest in disclosure. Moreover, private system operators have even more latitude in this
area than the government. Because the Constitution does not guarantee anonymity, an
anonymity rule must therefore be justified on policy grounds. For an excellent discussion
of this issue, see A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity and its Enmities, 1995 J Online L art 4
(1995) (arguing that a narrowly drawn statutory ban on anonymity would likely be upheld
by the courts).
24 This idea is recognized in Hynes v Mayor and Council of Oradell, 425 US 610, 628
(1976) (Brennan concurring in part).
25 See Bates v City of Little Rock, 361 US 516, 522-24 (1960) (holding that the
NAACP could not be required to disclose the names of its members).
2' This approach will be examined at greater length in Part II.
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gy.2 Both of these points show how privacy concerns can be
accomodated outside of an anonymity default environment.
To be sure, the benefits from disclosure could also be ob-
tained under an anonymity default rule by the clever system
operator that can induce system users to agree to disclosure.
Here, however, we run into the classic 'collective action' or 'free
rider' problem.2" The value of a disclosure environment to indi-
vidual users is that with disclosure they can obtain more infor-
mation and be better protected against crimes and torts. Users
thus benefit from having other users agree to disclosure. They
have little incentive, however, to agree to disclosure themselves.
In an anonymity default environment, therefore, it is likely that
a suboptimal number of users will waive their anonymity.
By contrast, in a disclosure default environment, the users
who benefit the most from anonymity-that is, the users who
place the highest value on their privacy-have exactly the right
incentive to opt for anonymity because all of the gains from doing
so accrue to the users who opt for it. That is, there is no external
benefit (or harm) associated with opting for anonymity over dis-
closure. Assuming the informational and transactional costs29
with respect to the "opt out" provision are sufficiently low, a close
to optimal number of "opt outs" will occur. Moreover, since most
users would probably prefer a disclosure environment,3" fewer
27 An anonymous remailer allows system users to send untraceable messages, there-
by guaranteeing their anonymity. Froomkin observes that very little can be done to
prevent users from availing themselves of this technology. See Froomkin, 1995 J Online L
art 4 at 9 30 (cited in note 23).
28 These terms have been borrowed from economics and have many applications in
the law. For a more detailed explanation of these ideas and their application to law, see
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 63 (Little, Brown, 4th ed 1992).
' Users need to be informed of their status under the background legal rule and then
need to be given a means to contract around the rule if they choose. One of the nice fea-
tures about cyberspace is that the cost of informational exchange and communication is
almost nil. Hence, strong anonymity interests are not likely to be compromised by a
disclosure default rule. For a discussion of low transaction costs in the cyberspace context,
see Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U Chi Legal F 217.
30 This is an empirical claim. It is based on the facts that: (a) most system users cur-
rently operate in a disclosure environment; (b) only a small minority use anonymous
remailers; and (c) anonymous remailers are relatively easy to obtain. Possible objections
to this claim are: (a) perhaps most users are unaware that they in fact are operating in a
disclosure environment; (b) even if they are aware of this, perhaps they are either un-
aware of the possibility of using anonymous remailers or else unable to obtain (or learn
how to use) anonymous remailers at a sufficiently low cost to make it worthwhile; and (c)
perhaps there are some people who do not conduct activities in cyberspace precisely
because it currently is a disclosure environment. My response to these objections is simply
to look at the costs and benefits of disclosure: for most people, the benefits-low cost
advertising, social possibilities, protection from anonymous harrassers and criminals, and
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corrective opt out transactions3 would be required under a
waivable disclosure rule. An anonymity default rule is more cost-
ly-in terms of both transaction costs and allocative effect-than
a disclosure default rule. And an anonymity rule would also be
antimajoritarian."
B. An Immutable Mandatory Disclosure Rule
Some politicians and pundits are so concerned about the
harms that anonymous actors in cyberspace may cause they
advocate banning anonymity from the Internet entirely and
nonnegotiably.33 This argument is foolish for two reasons. First,
it ignores the fact that anonymous remailers (which the govern-
ment, by its own admission, cannot stop)34 can facilitate these
criminal and tortious actors in any event. Second, the argument
ignores the enormous benefits that anonymity can sometimes
provide individual users.35 This inflexible rule thus yields few
benefits beyond what a waivable disclosure rule would yield
while at the same time imposes significant costs on system users
who deeply value their privacy. The rule is therefore exceedingly
unwise on its face and merits no further discussion.
C. The 'Wait and See' Approach
Professor Lawrence Lessig acknowledges the policy tension
'netsurfing' information sharing-seem quite large, while the costs-loss of the ability to
conceal one's actions in cyberspace-seem almost nil. This suggests that people operate in
a disclosure environment because it is in their interest to do so rather than because they
are uninformed in some way.
" By "corrective" transactions I mean instances of users contracting around a default
rule that does not suit their tastes.
32 On majoritarian default rules, see Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J 87 (1989) (cited
in note 13).
" See, for instance, the proposal of Connecticut State Representative Pat Dillon.
Beverly Galge, The Babe File, New Haven Advocate 7 (Feb 9, 1995); Walter S. Mossberg,
Accountability Is Key to Democracy in the On-Line World, Wall St J B1 (Jan 26, 1995)
(cited in note 8).
' See A- Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper
Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U Pa L Rev 709, 717 n 21 (1995) (cited in note 18) (sug-
gesting that if the government had the capacity to stop cryptography, it would be such a
"vital national secret ... the government would never use that capability in a manner
that would risk revealing its existence.").
' For the idiosyncratically private, anonymity has extremely high benefits that
would be entirely lost in a mandatory disclosure environment. Even if this loss would only
affect a small number of users, the stakes in this debate are high at least for them.
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between anonymity and disclosure in a recent article.36 Instead
of arguing for one or the other, however, he suggests that "we fol-
low the meandering development of the common law" and "stand
back from deciding these conflicts until the nature of these con-
flicts is well mapped, well constructed, [and] well understood."37
This view is qualified by the assertion that lower courts should
"wrestle with these questions .... But no court should purport to
decide these questions finally or even firmly."38 At bottom,
Lessig believes that cyberspace is somehow different from other
things over which law exercises control. Hence he concludes that
"[it will require that individuals gain an experience with this
new space" before we can "expect law to understand enough to
resolve these questions rightly.""
Lessig's romantic vision of cyberspace as a completely new
entity that cannot be analyzed like other areas of law is funda-
mentally flawed.4° New technology arrives on store shelves ev-
ery day, yet its patenting, licensing, packaging, distribution, and
sale are successfully governed by standard doctrines of patent,
copyright, trademark, agency, and contract that substantially
predate the technology in question. Law is well equipped to ad-
just to changing technology.
Moreover, the 'wait and see' approach does not help a court
faced with an actual case.4" The court must pick a rule in any
event, so it might as well pick the one it thinks is best, notwith-
standing our perhaps limited knowledge of this new entity called
cyberspace. Even a bad rule will have the salutary effect of let-
ting the parties-system users and operators-know where they
stand in relation to one another and thus will help them struc-
ture their future activities in a more informed way. Professor
Lessig's wait and see suggestion is thus at odds with the "rule of
law" values fundamental to our system of justice.42
' Lessig, 104 Yale L J at 1749-52 (1995) (cited in note 2).
17 Id at 1752.
Id at 1752-53.
Id at 1752.
40 For a lively criticism of this type of thinking, see Frank H. Easterbrook,
Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U Chi Legal F 207.
"' Were a system user to bring suit against a system operator for making
noconsensual disclosures of the user's cyberactivity to third parties, the court could
hardly tell the litigants to come back in a few years when the court will have a better
understanding of what cyberspace is. Even a no liability ruling is effectively a particular
type of default rule. Whatever the court does, therefore, will in some sense "decide" the
case today. Why is Professor Lessig against deciding it "finally and firmly?"
42 Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 72 (University of Chicago, 1944)
(explaining the "rule of law" ideal). See also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of
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II. A DISCLOSURE DEFAULT RULE APPROACH
A disclosure default rule, without any duty on the system
operator to inform users that they are operating in a disclosure
environment, would fail to protect system users from having
their privacy invaded without their knowledge or consent. The
likelihood that users will not know the background legal rule is
high, and thus the chance of market failure due to informational
asymmetries is also high. It is no surprise, therefore, that no
commentator has advocated insulating from liability system oper-
ators who, without warning, expose their users to a disclosure
environment. Yet, this in fact is the state of the law today.
One possible response to this problem of asymmetric infor-
mation is to have the court adopt a 'penalty'43 default rule slant-
ed against the more sophisticated of the two parties. The ano-
nymity default rule" is an example of the penalty default ap-
proach. Some policy makers and commentators, no doubt moti-
vated by the problems inherent in a disclosure default rule, in
effect argue for a penalty default rule of this type-a rule, that
is, slanted against system operators.45
Waivable anonymity rules have problems of their own, how-
ever.41 I believe it is possible to address the information problem
that a disclosure default rule presents without necessarily
switching over to an anonymity rule. This could be done by add-
ing two additional features to the disclosure default rule: namely,
a warning requirement and an "opt out" provision.
Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175 (1989).
" On penalty default rules, see Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J at 93-94 (1989)
(cited in note 13). Often referred to as an "information forcing" rule, the penalty default
rule is typically slanted against the more sophisticated party-in this case probably the
system operator-who is more likely to know the legal rule and hence is in a better
position to propose contracting around the rule should it be in the mutual interest of the
parties to do so.
44 See notes 20-32 and accompanying text.
" See Ronald H. Brown, et* al, Privacy and the NII: Safeguarding Telecommunica-
tions-Related Personal Information, US Department of Commerce (1995) (cited in note 12)
(arguing for a requirement that "consent" be obtained from system users before informa-
tion concerning them can be collected and used). See also the statutory proposal in David
R. Johnson and Kevin A. Marks, Mapping Electronic Data Communications onto Existing
Legal Metaphors: Should We Let Our Conscience (and Our Contracts) Be Our Guide?, 38
Vill L Rev 487 (1993) (cited in note 12) (advocating a statute requiring system operators
affirmatively to obtain consent from their users prior to making disclosures to third
parties); George P. Long, III, Who Are You?: Identity and Anonymity in Cyberspace, 55 U
Pitt L Rev 1177 (1994) (cited in note 4).
4 See, for instance, the above discussion of the free rider and collective action issues
raised in connection with an anonymity default rule in the text accompanying notes 28-32.
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First, system operators could be required affirmatively to
warn their users that they operate in a disclosure environment.
This would put users on notice that their privacy potentially
could be invaded.
Second, system operators could also be required to offer us-
ers the choice of opting out from participation in the disclosure
environment. A user wishing to opt out would have to do some-
thing affirmatively to indicate that preference. System operators
would be free to make disclosures (without liability) of the
cyberactivity of any user who has not opted out. In this way,
users who value their privacy particularly highly will be put on
notice that their private actions potentially could be monitored.
These users could then go through the relatively painless proce-
dure of opting out.
Both the warning and the opt out choice could be communi-
cated electronically at a very low cost. With transaction costs as
low as they are in cyberspace, placing additional communicative
burdens on transacting parties is not prohibitive. At the same
time, these additional communications yield an end result more
closely in line with the parties' preferences than the result pro-
duced by any other rule here considered.
Another nice effect of this disclosure default rule with warn-
ing and opt out provisions is that the rule is simultaneously
majoritarian and information forcing.47 A disclosure environ-
ment is majoritarian since most users would contract for it on
their own ex ante with knowledge of all the facts.48 The warning
requirement is information forcing in that the more sophisticated
party-here, the system operator-must tell the less sophisticat-
ed party-here, the user-about the background legal rule in
order for that rule to go into effect.49
What about the problem of the anonymous harrasser, who
will surely choose to opt out? As argued above, ° anonymous
Normally, the whole justification for adopting a penalty default rule is that a
majoritarian rule hurts the minority who would contract around the background rule if
only they knew what it was. See Ayres & Gertner, 99 Yale L J 87 (cited in note 13). Here,
the majoritarian rule itself is information forcing, given the warning requirement.
' I concede this is an empirical claim. For a discussion and defense of this claim, see
note 30. Also remember that if this assumption turns out to be wrong, all that will hap-
pen is that a majority of users will "opt out." Should this happen, the system operator will
in effect be back in a waivable anonymity environment and will be free to contract around
the rule with its users if it wishes.
"' In effect, this regime employs a penalty default, anonymity rule slanted against all
system operators who create a disclosure environment without warning their users.
0 See note 34 and accompanying text.
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remailers will in any event be the avenues of choice for
"cybercriminals" and "cybertortfeasors." The risk of coming into
contact with people like these is a fixed cost of interacting in
cyberspace regardless of the legal rule chosen. No one would say,
however, that this cost is so high it justifies shutting down
cyberspace.5 Moreover, this cost will not vary much in response
to the selection of alternative legal regimes to govern cyberspace.
So this cost has no effect on the analysis here as it bears no rela-
tion to the background legal rule.
Finally, the free rider/collective action problem discussed
above52 is avoided with the adoption of the disclosure/warning
rule suggested here. Only the user who values privacy idiosyn-
cratically highly has an incentive to opt out.
Why will everyone not opt out? Because there is a cost (albeit
a small one) to opting out. The user will be required to fill out an
electronic "opt out request form," which requires a small amount
of time and effort. This exertion of time and effort is not worth-
while for the typical user who does not care in the least about
disclosure. The typical user gains nothing from opting out. More-
over, note that the potential for everyone to opt out will give the
system operator an incentive to design a disclosure environment
in which most people will prefer to participate.53
CONCLUSION
This Comment has considered several alternative approaches
to the regulation of cyberactivity disclosures. The current legal
regime of disclosure as the default rule54 is recommended as the
correct policy with two small modifications: in the future, system
operators ought to be required (1) to warn their users of the pre-
vailing background legal rule and (2) to offer their users an op-
tion not to participate in a disclosure environment. This approach
is superior to the anonymity default and mandatory disclosure
" Just as no one would say we should ban free speech just because some people can
yell racial slurs at us when we walk through the park. Even with a legal ban on hate
speech, the racist will continue to yell. We therefore do not ban speech. Nor do we ban
walking in the park. Both the racist and the cybercriminal will be with us irrespective of
the rules we choose.
52 See notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
We see a phenomenon similar to that suggested here in the telephone industry,
where companies compete along the dimension of privacy assurance as well as on price
and quality. See Brown, et al, Privacy and the NIl: Safeguarding Telecommunications-
Related Personal Information n 35, US Department of Commerce (1995) (cited in note 12).
No liability now attaches to system operators who expose their users to a disclo-
sure environment, the Clinton Administration's policy suggestions notwithstanding.
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rules advocated by some and also is more useful in practice than
Professor Lessig's 'wait and see' approach. This is so, principally,
because none of the other legal rules considered is at once
majoritarian, information forcing, and bereft of free riding and
collective action concerns.

